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1. Introduction
Essays on Skepticism is a collection of Anthony Brueckner’s articles on episte-
mological skepticism from the last 25 years. Or rather, as Brueckner is a pro-
lific writer, it is a selection. As a selection of a single contemporary philosopher’s 
essays on skepticism, I harbor little skepticism that Brueckner’s Essays on 
Skepticism is the best that there is to be found.
The volume consists of an introduction and 36 chapters, of which 31 are 
previously published journal articles. The remaining 5 chapters are previously 
unpublished. The chapters are of very different substance and length ranging 
from two-page pieces that make a critical point or a pointed criticism to long 
and substantive pieces. The introduction is, in Brueckner’s trademark style, 
concise and to the point. Towards the end of it Brueckner writes:
[The problem of skepticism] …is an incredibly rich and difficult problem that 
must be approached in a careful and patient manner. As one often finds in 
philosophy, the devil is in the details. (p. 5)
The essays themselves exemplify this methodological credo. From the earli-
est papers to the latest, Brueckner criticizes impatient solutions to skeptical 
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problems. A great number of specific anti-skeptical arguments are assessed and 
argued to be wanting. On the other hand, Brueckner is also arguing that vari-
ous anti-skeptical argument strategies that have been dismissed deserve to be 
reassessed. In a similar spirit, Brueckner does not presuppose that there is a 
skeptical problem to be answered. Rather, he scrutinizes the structure and 
cogency of a range of skeptical arguments.
Since it would be inappropriate to discuss a careful and patient collection 
of essays in a careless and hurried manner, I will not seek to provide a compre-
hensive discussion. Rather, I will supplement a broad overview with some 
more specific but representative discussions (giving some preference to unpub-
lished papers). This approach is more congenial to the book’s approach than a 
broad, generic discussion. So, I hope that it will be both illustrative and 
informative.
2. Overview
Here’s a paper criticizing an anti-skeptical transcendental argument, and 
here’s another criticizing a closure-driven skeptical argument. Here’s a piece 
suggesting a novel skeptical argument, and here’s another considering the rela-
tion between anti-individualism and self-knowledge. The volume illustrates 
why Brueckner is regarded for providing a large number of critical articles on 
a wide variety of issues. If one considers those essays in the order they were 
written over the course of 25 years, one might get the impression that 
Brueckner is an opportunistic theorist who contributes to the literature on 
skepticism in an entirely piecemeal manner. A nice thing about the present 
selection, therefore, is that it succeeds in providing a fairly unified and coher-
ent treatment of skepticism that shows how this underlying theme ties together 
strands of Brueckner’s work. However, the interrelations between Brueckner’s 
various contributions are often subtle, and the volume does not have the 
structure of a monograph. For example, the format yields numerous repeti-
tions, terminological changes and non-equivalent statements of similar argu-
ments and principles etc. But nevertheless, the volume largely succeeds as a 
sustained investigation.
The organization of the volume contributes a great deal to this sense 
of coherence, structured, as it is, around four interrelated themes. In Section 
I, Brueckner discusses the problems and prospects of (Kantian) transcendental 
arguments. Section II is devoted to contemporary semantic answers to skepti-
cism and contains three parts—one on Putnam, one on Davidson and a sin-
gle-chapter part on McDowell. Section III concerns self-knowledge and is 
divided in two parts. Part A concerns content externalism and self-knowledge 
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whereas Part B addresses an argument to the effect that they are incompatible 
(the McKinsey Problem). Finally, Section IV concerns the 
structure of skeptical arguments and the epistemic principles and assumptions 
invoked therein.
The organization of the Essays on Skepticism makes it apt for use in teaching. 
One could easily base an advanced undergraduate course or a research seminar 
around one of the sections by supplementing it with selected papers from the 
other sections. Another reason why the volume is a reasonable choice for 
teaching is that Brueckner is a good model of philosophical writing due to his 
clear and to-the-point style.
3. Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism vis-à-vis the 
McKinsey Paradox
I will merge my discussion of Section I on transcendental arguments, 
Section II on semantic answers to skepticism, and Section III on self-knowl-
edge in order to emphasize interconnections between them.
The opening Chapters 1 and 2 consist of “Transcendental Arguments” 
I and II, respectively. These papers contributed both to establishing Brueckner 
on the philosophical scene in the midst of a renewed interest in skepticism and 
to setting the direction for much of the body of work that constitutes 
Essays on Skepticism. A Kantian Transcendental argument may, according to 
Brueckner, be characterized as one “…which purports to show that the exis-
tence of physical objects of a certain general character is a condition for the 
possibility of self-conscious experience” (Chap. 1, p. 11). In the introduction, 
Brueckner characterizes an anti-skeptical transcendental argument more 
broadly as an argument that “… starts from a slender premise about, roughly 
speaking, one’s mind, a premise that even a skeptic will grant as known” (p. 1).
In Chapters 1–6, Brueckner criticizes a number of anti-skeptical transcen-
dental arguments and strategies and critiques thereof. These include various 
Kantian strategies and two critical assessments of Barry Stroud’s famous cri-
tique of transcendental arguments (Chap. 4 and 6). However, it is worth 
emphasizing Chapter 5, “Transcendental Arguments from Content 
Externalism,” because it marks a very important overlap with Section II, 
Semantic Answers to Skepticism, as well as Part III Self-Knowledge. As the survey 
in Chapter 5 illustrates, the transcendental arguments from content external-
ism can vary quite greatly depending on how the above mentioned “slender 
premise” is construed. In Chapter 5 and Part II, Brueckner considers constru-
als that derive from Searle and, more prominently, Putnam (Chap. 7–11) and 
Davidson (Chap. 12–13).
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However, Brueckner is especially preoccupied with a transcendental 
argument from content externalism or anti-individualism of the Burgean 
variety (Burge 1979, 1982). Here the relevant “slender premise” about 
one’s own mind is the thesis that many of one’s thoughts are partly 
individuated by patterns of relations to the external environment. 
The second key premise required for the argument is that we have 
privileged access to the contents of our own thoughts. In Chapter 5, 
Brueckner structures the discussion by “a naïve way of constructing such an 
argument”:
(1):  If I am thinking that water is clear, then I have had causal contact with 
H2O (rather than XYZ).
(2):  I am thinking that water is clear.
(3):  So, I have had causal contact with H2O (rather than XYZ) (Chap. 5, p. 
95—numbering of premises added).
The first premise is allegedly established a priori by a version of a Twin 
Earth thought experiment (Putnam 1974, Burge 1982), and so, the 
reasoning goes, the skeptic has no reason to reject it. Likewise, the skeptic has 
no reason to reject the second premise insofar as privileged access is justifica-
torily independent from the sense experience that the skeptic is skeptical 
about.
Brueckner argues that the naïve transcendental argument from content 
externalism fails. However, in order to illustrate what I claimed to be a nicety 
about the volume—that it illuminates connections between Brueckner’s 
articles—it is worth connecting the naïve argument to the discussions of self-
knowledge in Section III before considering Brueckner’s assessment of it. In 
particular, it is worth noting that the naïve argument may also be conceived as 
a reductio of the compatibility of content externalism and privileged access—
the so-called McKinsey problem.
The McKinsey problem owes its name to Michel McKinsey who proposed 
that the reasoning similar to that of the naïve transcendental argument is, in 
fact, a reductio of the compatibility of content externalism and privileged 
access. The reason why is that if both (1) and (2) can be known a priori and 
the inference to (3) is also a priori, then (3) itself can be known a priori. But 
since (3) is a substantive and specific truth about the world, it is unreasonable 
to suppose that it can be known a priori. Therefore, (1) and (2) are 
incompatible.
Brueckner’s Chapter 18 was the first explicit response to McKinsey’s 
problem in the literature that unfolded in the 1990s, and Chapters 19–23 
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elaborate on this response.1 The core of Brueckner’s response to the McKinsey 
problem consists in arguing that content externalism (anti-individualism) 
does not entail or otherwise involve the assumption that thinking water 
thoughts entails that one has been in contact with H2O (rather than XYZ). So, 
(1) cannot be known a priori (see Chap. 18, 19, and 23). Brueckner often 
illustrates this claim by noting that a content externalist can consistently 
assume (and should assume) that one can think empty thoughts—thoughts 
that fail to refer to anything, such as phlogiston-thoughts (Chap. 23). A corol-
lary is that (3) cannot be a known priori because it cannot be known a priori 
that one’s concept of water is not empty, such as the concept of phlogiston.
This summary of Brueckner’s response to the McKinsey problem leaves out 
considerable interesting detail that includes criticism of alternative responses 
due to Brewer (Chap. 20) and Wright (Chap. 21). But it illustrates why 
Brueckner rejects the naïve transcendental argument from content external-
ism. To see this connection, let’s return to Chapter 5. Here Brueckner notes, 
first, that a content externalist may simply argue that (1) is false and, hence, 
not knowable and, hence, not knowable a priori. Moreover, Brueckner argues 
that whether or not the content externalist is committed to (1), it cannot be 
known a priori by a Twin Earth thought experiment. To know (1), one needs 
to rule out that one’s water concept is not empty and this may only be done a 
posteriori. So, Brueckner’s reasons for rejecting naïve transcendental argu-
ments are identical to his reasons for upholding compatibilism between con-
tent externalism (anti-individualism) and privileged access to one’s own 
mental states.
However, Brueckner discusses some more sophisticated strategies for anti-
skeptical arguments from content externalism than the naïve transcendental 
argument (see, e.g., Chap. 5, 9, and 10). In general, Brueckner suggests that 
“…the anti-skeptical prospects of such a refutation are dim” (Chap. 9, 
p. 152). But he is also arguing that while the prospects of a refutation may be 
dim, they have not been shown to be hopeless (Chap. 6 and 10).
One reason for cautious optimism may be reflected by what appears to be 
a shift in anti-skeptical strategy. Brueckner’s latest papers do not exclusively 
1 Brueckner was the most active proponent of compatibilism. Michael McKinsey and Jessica 
Brown advocated for incompatibilism. The dispute has been less prominent since Brown 
changed her position to a version of compatibilism (see Brown 2004 and Gerken 2007b 
for a criticism). As far as I can gather, Brueckner's papers use ‘content externalism’ and ‘anti-
individualism’ interchangeably. This is presumably because Burge's theory is the target of the 
problem. As Brueckner notes, his responses are congenial to the “pre-emptive” responses in 
Burge (1982, 1988).
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focus on refuting an already established skepticism deriving from Putnam’s 
brain-in-a-vat (BIV) scenario. Rather, they seek to question the assumptions 
operative in such a BIV argument in light of content externalist accounts of 
representational mental states. In Chap. 10, for example, Brueckner considers 
whether content externalism may be employed to argue against the skeptical 
premise that S does not know that she is a BIV rather than to argue against the 
skeptical conclusion. Brueckner’s discussions suggest, I think, that the former 
strategy is more promising than the latter. Perhaps this is an important meth-
odological lesson that may be learned from Brueckner’s work on transcenden-
tal arguments. In any case, it may be illustrative to consider a concrete example 
of this strategy in a bit more detail.
4. Terms of Envatment
As mentioned at the outset, Brueckner is equally concerned with problems of 
responding to skepticism and problems of generating skepticism in the first 
place. To illustrate the latter, I will consider Chapter 11 (a short and previously 
unpublished paper, “Terms of Envatment,” co-written with Jon Altschul). 
Brueckner describes it as “a brief coda in which the limitations of the 
Putnamian strategy are discussed” (Introduction, p. 3).
Chapter 11 begins by noting a problem for deriving a skeptical conclusion 
from Putnam’s BIV scenario and auxiliary assumptions. This problem may be 
presented as a dilemma for a brand of BIV skepticism according to which a 
subject cannot know that he is not massively deceived due to being envatted. 
One the one hand, if the subject is imagined to be envatted late in life, he will 
have a large number of true memory-generated beliefs about the world he 
used to inhabit. On the other hand, if he is envatted early in life, he will soon 
enough undergo a conceptual change and begin to form true beliefs about 
features of the computer program. In either case, the “…brain in a vat will not 
lead a life in which he is massively mistaken about his world” (Chap. 11, 
p. 175). The assumptions figuring in or underlying this dilemma might be 
questioned by the BIV skeptic. For example, the BIV skeptic might challenge 
the first horn of the dilemma by arguing that the subject fails to retain his true 
memory beliefs after the envatment.
However, Brueckner and Altschul suggest that the skeptic need not quarrel 
with these assumptions. For the assumption that the subject cannot rule out a 
BIV scenario in which he is massively deceived is not required if a piecemeal 
BIV skeptical argument may be provided instead. In order to consider this 
form of BIV skepticism, the chapter turns to a standard closure-driven 
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 argument that plays a pivotal role in many of Brueckner’s essays. Here, as 
elsewhere, the “standard skeptical argument” is given an explicit formulation 
at the outset (Chap. 11, p. 175). The terminology is as follows: φ is any exter-
nal world proposition that a thinker S claims to know, ψ is a skeptical coun-
terpossibility to φ and ‘®’ stands for the material conditional, ‘® >’ stands for 
the strict conditional and ‘K_’ stands for ‘S knows that _’):
 S1: [K(φ) & K(φ ® > ~ψ)] ® K(~ψ)
 S2: K(φ ® > ~ψ)
 S3: ~ K(~ψ)
 S4: ~ K(φ)
This argument schema may work as a template for deriving skepticism about 
the vast majority of external world propositions. The idea is that for each 
external world proposition, φ, a specific skeptical counterpossibility, ψ, can be 
devised. Often, this will be the counterpossibility that S was envatted the day 
before generating the belief that φ. Thus, the chapter concludes that “…the 
skeptic can provide a piecemeal procedure for producing a spate of skeptical 
arguments, each of which targets some proposition φ that S claims to know. 
For each φ, ~ K(φ)” (Chap. 11, p. 176).
The first thing to note is that the piecemeal BIV skeptical strategy involves 
not just one but a wealth of different BIV skeptical scenarios, each of which is 
tailored to a target proposition. The second thing to note is that some of them 
are more controversial than others. Consider the case where φ is a placeholder 
for the proposition P4 = water exists. Here the skeptical counterpossibility 
instantiating ψ is “RE4 = S was envatted yesterday and provided with mistaken 
apparent memories like those of a thinker in a water-filled normal world, along 
with current unveridical experiences as of seeing waves breaking on the beach.” A 
footnote adds: “We must add that S loses his veridical Dry Earth memories 
upon envatment” (Chap. 11, p. 176, n. 6).
As opposed to familiar Dry Earth scenarios, due to Burge and Boghossian, 
the inhabitants on Altschul and Brueckner’s Dry Earth are not massively 
deceived (Burge 1982, Boghossian 1989).2 Rather, they have veridical experi-
ences of desert landscapes. This is why the footnote adds that S’s veridical Dry 
Earth memories are, upon envatment, eliminated and replaced with mistaken 
apparent memories phenomenally indiscernible from ordinary water 
memories.
2 This is not entirely clear from the text. Correspondence with Brueckner clarified the issue.
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RE4 raises many questions. But here I will focus on the addition to the 
original BIV scenario that consists in the assumption that S’s veridical pre-
envatment memories are replaced by non-veridical apparent memories. This 
addition is not dialectically benign given that the point of providing a piece-
meal BIV skepticism is to sidestep the dilemma for the original BIV skepti-
cism. In fact, if RE4 is required by the piecemeal approach, this approach 
appears to be little but a detour. The reason why is that given the addition, 
RE4 seems strong enough to rebut the first horn of the dilemma. Recall that 
the first horn posed the problem that the envatted subject would not be mas-
sively deceived in virtue of retaining many true beliefs in memory. A skeptical 
argument based on RE4 that assumes that new mistaken apparent memories 
are supplied and that veridical Dry Earth memories are eliminated appears to 
preempt this problem. At least, it seems that if the skeptic may legitimately 
appeal to this assumption, she can equally well appeal to the assumption that 
all veridical memories are replaced with mistaken apparent memories. But this 
assumption would put the original BIV skepticism back in business. So, if the 
kind of assumption that RE4 exemplifies is required for the piecemeal skepti-
cism but is, in effect, strong enough to drive the original BIV skepticism, why 
bother with the piecemeal skepticism?
More substantially, it should be investigated further whether the modified 
BIV scenario, RE4, in which S’s veridical memories are replaced with non-
veridical apparent memories, is as challenging as the original BIV scenario. 
The assumption that the original BIV hypothesis is possible is partly moti-
vated by appeal to the idea that we can be prone to indiscernible illusions. 
One can have the same (type-identical) phenomenal states as one is having 
when perceiving a vase even if there is no vase on a particular occasion. This 
provides a prima facie reason for thinking that it is possible to undergo such an 
illusion in general, and the BIV scenario is an example of such a possibility. In 
contrast, the added thesis that antecedently generated representational mental 
states in long-term memory can be artificially replaced with phenomenally dif-
ferent non-veridical apparent memories appears to require a motivation of its 
own. That is, it should be argued that there is no relevant difference between 
perception and long-term memory. So, RE4 raises both dialectic and substan-
tive questions.
This is not the place to pursue this complicated matter.3 So, I will turn to 
another feature of the argument that Brueckner is preoccupied with. What I 
3 For relevant discussions in a somewhat different context, namely a slow-switch case in 
which the subject is not envatted but transported to Twin Earth, see Chap. 17 as well as Ludlow 
(1995), Tye (1998), and Gerken (2007a, 2009, and forthcoming).
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have in mind is S1, which is a version of a closure principle that the essays in 
Part IV of Essays on Skepticism revolve around.
5. Epistemic Closure Principles and the Structure of  
Skeptical Arguments
As mentioned, each of Brueckner’s discussions typically revolves around a spe-
cific skeptical argument. This makes good methodological sense. Part of what 
we might learn from considering skeptical arguments is that one of the epis-
temic assumptions or principles that we tend to rely on or presuppose is, in 
fact, mistaken. After all, a challenging skeptical argument is one that proceeds 
from epistemic assumptions that we are antecedently inclined to accept to its 
intolerable conclusion. These assumptions often reflect epistemic principles. 
So, skeptical arguments provide a philosophically pressing occasion to criti-
cally reflect on epistemic principles and assumptions. Epistemic closure prin-
ciples are examples of principles that we might well be inclined to uncritically 
accept if it were not for their role in skeptical arguments.
Brueckner is not one to provide meta-philosophical remarks, such as the 
one in the previous paragraph. There is very little discussion in Essays on 
Skepticism on the point and purpose of investigating skepticism or on the best 
methodology of doing so. Nevertheless, Brueckner’s essays have contributed 
to the present focus on the structure of skeptical arguments and the emphasis 
on a precise articulation of the assumptions figuring in it. As mentioned, 
Brueckner often discusses skeptical arguments that rely on a version of a 
Closure Principle. In Chapter 29, “The Structure of the Skeptical Argument,” 
Brueckner gives a formulation of the principle that knowledge is closed under 
known entailment:
(CIK)  For all, S, φ, ψ, if S knows that φ and S knows that (φ ® ψ), then S 
knows that ψ. (Chap. 29, p. 319).4
However, such closure principles have been in dispute since Dretske’s 
attack on them (Dretske 1970, 1971). Interestingly, Brueckner is able to pro-
vide a skeptical argument in which we “…need not appeal to the closure 
4 It should also be required that S competently deduces ψ from her antecedent knowledge. 
(CIK) is a principle of epistemic rationality and one need not believe, and hence know, all the 
consequences of one's knowledge to be rational. While (CIK), as stated, will be subject to coun-
terexamples, in which S fails to competently deduce ψ from φ, this is irrelevant for Brueckner's 
discussion. So, I follow him in omitting the qualification for the sake of presentation.
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principle…” (Chap. 29, p. 324. See also Chap. 36, p. 369, n. 4). The epis-
temic premise which can replace closure is an underdetermination principle:
(UP)  For all, S, φ, ψ, if S’s evidence for believing that φ does not favor φ over 
some incompatible hypothesis, ψ, then S lacks justification for believ-
ing that φ.
With (UP) in hand, Brueckner suggests that (where SK is a skeptical counter-
possibility to P) “… it is not necessary to appeal to a closure principle which 
connects my epistemic failure with respect to ~SK with a corresponding fail-
ure with respect to the entailing proposition P” (Chap. 29, 325). However, 
Brueckner cautiously remarks that some of the responses to (CIK) apply to 
(UP). More importantly, he raises the worry that getting from (UP) to skepti-
cism might involve a brand of infallibilism: “… in the end, the skeptic 
is  arguing that my lack of justification for believing that I am sitting 
 ulti mately derives from the fact that my evidence for this belief is non- 
entailing” (Chap. 29, p. 326). This is, of course, a far more radical assumption 
than UP that only requires that one’s evidence does not favor P over ~SK.
The relationship between fallibilism, underdetermination and skepticism is 
reconsidered more explicitly in the aptly titled Chapter 34, “Fallibilism, 
Underdetermination and Skepticism.” Here Brueckner focuses on fallibilism 
about justification and reaches a twofold conclusion. On the one hand, the 
skeptic must “…respect the assumption of fallibilism” in her motivation of the 
premise that S does not know that she is not in a skeptical scenario, SK. On 
the other hand, Brueckner argues that it is “…incumbent upon the anti-skep-
tic to mount an argument to show F, i.e., to show that my putative perceptual 
justifier does favor ~SK over SK” (Chap. 34, p. 357). The distinctively 
Bruecknerian conclusion, then, is that both the skeptic and her opponent have 
intellectually unsatisfying rationales for their positions.
6. ~K~SK
The final chapter—the previously unpublished Chapter 36—is entitled 
“~K~SK” in honor of the skeptical premise that I do not know that I am not 
a BIV (the skeptical scenario: SK), which is the focus of the paper. Here the 
underdetermination principle, UP, does not replace a closure principle. Rather, 
it supplements it by providing a motivation for the premise ~K~SK. In fact, the 
motivation involves two assumptions. The first is the contraposition of the 
above-stated underdetermination principle:
(UP)  If S has justification for believing that φ, and φ is incompatible with ψ, 
then S’s evidence for φ favors φ over ψ.
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The second is the assumption that experiences do not provide evidence in 
favor of SK over ~SK (since S’s experiences in SK are indiscernible from those 
in ~SK):
(~F) My experiential evidence for ~SK does not favor ~SK over SK.
Brueckner explicates the motivation for ~K~SK as follows: “From UP and ~F, 
it follows that I am not justified in believing ~SK, and so: ~K~SK” (Chap. 36, 
p. 369).
This is a rare formal flaw in Essays on Skepticism. In fact, it does not follow 
from UP and ~F that S is not justified in believing ~SK. Recall that according 
to UP, justification requires evidential disparity. But ~F only establishes parity 
of experiential evidence. So, the consequent of UP is not negated by ~F. Hence, 
the modus tollens argument fails. UP and ~F are logically compatible with S 
possessing non-experiential evidence favoring ~SK over SK.
This flaw in the skeptic’s UP-based motivation for the premise ~K~SK 
should be taken seriously by someone who, like Brueckner, takes seriously 
the prospects of transcendental arguments. For, as we have seen, some such 
arguments that target the premise ~K~SK appeal to premises motivated by 
non-experiential evidence—i.e., by introspection and thought experiments 
(cf. Chap. 10 and 11).5
Setting this criticism aside, Brueckner provides an interesting consideration 
of whether the UP-based motivation for the premise ~K~SK in effect relies on 
infallibilism about justification. Specifically, Brueckner considers the motiva-
tion for ~F. He assumes that it begins from a Sameness of Evidence Lemma 
(SEL), according to which “I have exactly the same evidence in the good 
[veridical - MG] and the bad [skeptical - MG] case” (Chap. 36, p. 376). The 
question Brueckner raises is whether there is a direct line of reasoning from 
SEL to ~F or whether the reasoning must go via an infallibilist assumption, 
JEP, roughly that justification for the belief that p must entail that p and the 
assumption, ~ENT, that the proposition I have SE (a sense-experience) fails to 
entail ~SK (Chap. 36, p. 379–80).
According to Brueckner, the adoption of ~ENT and infallibilism would 
render the skeptical argument via Closure and UP redundant. But the argu-
ment from Closure and UP was supposed to be challenging because it relied 
on premises that we were antecedently inclined to accept rather than on 
5 A related worry concerns whether UP is more plausible than ~K~SK. For example, 
someone (a classical reliabilist, for example) may argue against UP on the grounds that it hinges 
on the strongly evidentialist assumption that all justification is constituted by evidence. In con-
trast, ~K~SK does not have such a theoretical commitment. Thanks to Esben Nedenskov 
Petersen.
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infallibilist principles that we were antecedently inclined to reject. How-
ever, Brueckner considers a direct line of reasoning from SEL to ~F but con-
cludes that “It’s just not entirely clear whether the charge that the skeptical 
argument collapses into Infallibilism can be successfully answered by the skep-
tic” (Chap. 36, p. 381).
As the reader will have become accustomed to at the end of Essays on 
Skepticism, Brueckner’s conclusion is quite open-ended. But Chapter 36 nev-
ertheless illustrates what I take to be a putative methodological lesson from 
Brueckner’s work: that it is more promising to undermine the motivation for 
a premise in the skeptical argument than to try to argue against it.
7. Concluding Remarks
As mentioned, Brueckner rarely provides meta-commentary on the methodol-
ogy of his investigations. The investigations do the talking. Yet I think that an 
important methodological lesson may be learned. With regards to transcen-
dental arguments, I took Brueckner’s discussions to suggest that transcenden-
tal arguments were more likely to establish the negation of a skeptical premise 
than to establish the negation of the skeptical conclusion. With regards to the 
structure of skeptical arguments, I took Brueckner’s discussions to suggest 
that it was more promising to argue against the underlying motivation for a 
skeptical premise than to argue directly against it. So, perhaps the overarching 
methodological lesson may be that anti-skeptical arguments are most likely to 
succeed if they seek to prevent the skeptical argument from getting off the 
ground. Arguing against the motivation for a skeptical premise may be both 
more promising and, if successful, as illuminating as arguing against the skep-
tical premise or conclusion.
Brueckner’s book is valuable, in part, because it considers a wide variety of 
skeptical and anti-skeptical strategies, allowing us to compare these. One 
would be silly to grapple with the skeptical problems that Brueckner discusses 
in Essays on Skepticism without familiarizing oneself with his discussions. Essays 
on Skepticism marks the best contemporary writing on skeptical problems in 
part because it sets a high standard for the work that remains to be done before 
we have an intellectually satisfying grasp of them.6
6 I am grateful to Anthony Brueckner, Esben Nedenskov Petersen and Baron Reed for helpful 
comments, and to Julie Brummer for help in preparing the manuscript.
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